Religion, Tolerance and Intolerance: Views from Across the Disciplines

Russell Powell and Steve Clarke,
University of Oxford

The New Religious Violence and the New Atheism……p. 2
What is Tolerance?..................................................p. 3
The Justification of Religious Tolerance………………..p. 5
The Rise of Tolerance……………………………………p. 7
Early Scientific Work on Religion and Intolerance……p. 8
Extrinsic/Intrinsic Orientations………………………..p. 10
Religion as Quest…………………………………………p. 13
Religious Fundamentalism……………………………..p. 14
Right-Wing Authoritarianism…………………………p. 15
Orthodoxy………………………………………………p. 16
Prejudice versus Intolerance…………………………p. 17
In-Group/Out-Group Effects…………………………p. 19
Evolutionary Anthropology…………………………p. 21
The New Religious Violence and the New Atheism

The events of September 11th 2001 have set off two academic debates. One is a debate about the causes of those events and the other is a more general debate about the influence of religion in society. While a few authors have wanted to stress the unprecedented nature of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th 2001 (e.g. Barber 2003), most have looked for precedents and tried to explain these events by relating them to earlier events. However, scholars have been divided on the right approach to adopt. On one side are those scholars, such as Goodin (2006) and Pape (2005) who, perhaps motivated inter alia by the relative lack of terrorist activity inspired by religious causes in the Twentieth Century, have wanted to stress the importance of the political dimensions of Al Qaeda’s conflict with the United States and its allies, and the relative unimportance of the religious aspects of that conflict. ¹ According to Pape, apparently religiously inspired Islamic suicide bombing is best explained in purely political terms. It has ‘...a simple strategic goal: to compel the United States and its allies to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim countries’ (2005, p. vi). On this view religion is incidental to the activities of religious terrorists. However, other scholars have wanted to stress the role of religion – particularly salvific religion – in transforming actions that would otherwise be straightforwardly political and means-end rational into ones that are not intelligible without recourse to the perspective of particular religions. According to Michael Ignatieff, for religiously motivated terrorists:

What matters most is securing entry into Paradise. Here, political violence becomes subservient not to a political end but to a personal one. Once violent means cease to serve determinate political ends, they take on a life of their own. When personal immortality becomes the goal, the terrorists cease to think like political actors, susceptible to rational calculation of effect, and begin to act like fanatics (Ignatieff 2004, p. 124). ²

While political theorists and political philosophers dispute the role of religion in causing terrorism, a broad-based intellectual movement, which has come to be known as the New Atheism (Stenger 2009), takes it for granted that religion is a key cause of terrorism and seeks to re-open old debates about the influence of religion on society. New atheists, including Dawkins (2006), Dennett (2006), Harris (2004) and Hitchens (2007) have advanced a highly polemical attack on religion. ³ Whereas old atheists such as Russell (1967) were mostly content to make the case for accepting atheism, and generally adopted an attitude of respect for and tolerance of religious belief, new atheists often urge us not to respect religion and to try to mitigate its influence. According to self declared new atheist Victor Stenger:

Perhaps the most unique position of New Atheism is that faith, which is belief without supportive evidence, should not be given the respect, even deference, it obtains in modern society. Faith is always foolish and leads to many of the evils of society (Stenger, 2009, p. 15). ⁴

In the strident words of the Christian opponent of new atheism, Dinesh D’Souza, new
atheists, ‘blame religion for the crimes of history and for the ongoing conflicts in the world today ... they want to make religion – and especially the Christian religion – disappear from the face of the earth’ (D’Souza 2007, p. xv.). If D’Souza is right, or even partly right, then the new atheist suspicion of the consequences of religion, and their concomitant rejection of respect for religion, are causes of new atheist intolerance towards religion. It seems plausible to think that many of the new atheists have joined some Christian opponents of Islam, and some Muslim opponents of ‘the west’, in challenging the widespread liberal assumption that religious tolerance is generally justified. Such new atheists do this in a more thoroughgoing way than intolerant religious believers, however, arguing that we should be less tolerant than we currently are of all religions.

According to Susan Mendus: ‘... for much of the 20th Century, political philosophers, too, believed that religious toleration was a ‘done deal’, a completed chapter in the history of western liberal democracies” (2007, Lecture Two). She cites leading political philosophers Rawls (1993) and Walzer (1997) as holding this view. But it now seems implausible to think of religious toleration as a ‘done deal’. The religious violence and religious intolerance that ravaged Europe in the Seventeenth Century may have been brought under control for a significant period of time, but the thought that this state of affairs would inevitably become a permanent one now seems very presumptuous. What is particularly striking is how little it has taken for the recent liberal consensus about the virtues of religious tolerance to be brought into question. The terrorist attacks of the first decade of the Twenty-First century are important events, but they do not approach the significance of the religious wars of the Seventeenth Century, either in terms of damage done or in terms of their political impact. And yet we are faced with a chorus of voices urging Christians not to tolerate Islam, Muslims not to tolerate ‘the west’, and atheists not to tolerate religion.

Here we seek to contribute to the newly emerging (old) debates about religion and tolerance by focusing on the causal relationship between religion and tolerance. Is religion a cause of tolerance, is it a cause of intolerance, or do some aspects of religion cause tolerance while others cause intolerance? We begin by looking briefly at the concept of tolerance, and at the historical emergence of the political ideal of religious tolerance. We then examine, in somewhat more detail, work in psychology where the causal relationship between religion and tolerance has long been a focal point of research efforts. We conclude by briefly discussing emerging work in the anthropology of religion that is relevant to the issue of religious tolerance.

What is Tolerance?

When we decide to tolerate an action or a practice, we decide to forego an opportunity to interfere in some instance of that activity or practice. Many of the fellows and students at Christ Church college, Oxford, do not like the steady stream of tourists looking though their
college grounds—and collectively, at least, they are in a position to stop it. However, they
decide not to exercise this power. They decide to put up with or tolerate tourism. In order for
their inaction to count as a genuine instance of toleration, however, they must find tourism in
the college grounds objectionable. If they did not find it objectionable then their attitude
would be one of indifference or approval, and we do not use the terms ‘toleration’ and
‘tolerance’ to describe cases where inaction is the result of indifference or approval
(Williams 1996, p. 20). An attitude of tolerance is only possible when some action or practice
is objectionable to us, but we have overriding reasons to allow that action or practice to take
place. An exception to this generalisation concerns a secondary sense of the term ‘tolerance’.
We are said to develop a tolerance of aspirin or caffeine when, typically through heavy use,
we become less affected by aspirin or caffeine. In this usage ‘tolerance’ is synonymous with
‘insensitivity’ and no negative judgment concerning the use of caffeine or aspirin need be
implied. In a third sense, ‘tolerance’ refers to a character trait or virtue that an agent may
have or may strive to acquire. Possession of the virtue of tolerance makes one more disposed
to perform acts of toleration (in the primary sense) than one would be otherwise.

Unsurprisingly, those who are the beneficiaries of the tolerant (in the primary sense of the
term) attitude of others do not always appreciate the implicit disapproval that is implied by
the fact that they (or their behaviour) are tolerated by others. For example, homosexual
activist groups have sometimes objected to the implied disapproval delivered by the various
churches that claim to ‘tolerate’ homosexuality. They argue that homosexuals are deserving
of a greater degree of respect than toleration implies (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2003).

Perhaps the most sophisticated of the various attempts to define toleration is due to Andrew
Cohen. According to him:

An act of toleration is an agent’s intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an
opposed other (or their behaviour, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has
the power to interfere. (Cohen 2004, p. 69).

If the agent has not considered refraining from interference, or has considered it and does not
intend to refrain from interference, then that agent’s action cannot be described as tolerant.
Only inaction that is intended can count as toleration. The stipulation that a lack of
interference must also be principled is included to rule out unprincipled non-interference, or
interference that is explained by some motive that one did not endorse as a value. I might
disapprove of an action and believe that it ought not to take place, but if I fail to act to try to
stop it because I am merely lazy then we would not describe my attitude as one of toleration
(unless, perhaps, I endorse laziness as a value). My non-interference must be grounded on
some sort of principle, although not necessarily a moral one, to count as tolerance.

Non-interference is central to tolerance, but this should not be understood too broadly. The
non-interference involved in toleration is direct non-interference in acts and practices. It need
not imply indirect non-interference in acts and practices. A devout Catholic may decide to
tolerate Protestant religious practices in her community and to not interfere in the conduct of
Protestant religious services, despite her disapproval of these. However, she may feel that the
attitude of tolerance that she displays does not extend to refraining from proselytizing on behalf of the Catholic Church to Protestants. She hopes to achieve the end of converting Protestants to Catholicism, causing *inter alia*, the cessation of Protestant religious practices, but takes the view that it would be wrong to do so by means other than by rational persuasion.

The clause ‘situations of diversity’ is included in the above definition of tolerance on the grounds that if there were no diversity between peoples, then there would be no differences between them to object to. Cohen includes the final clause ‘where the agent believes she has the power to interfere’ to distinguish toleration from resignation. If we believe that we have no power to stop the objectionable practice or activity, then our attitude toward that activity is not one of tolerance but of resignation.

### The Justification of Religious Tolerance

The most straightforward way of justifying toleration is pragmatic, and those who endorse a pragmatic justification of tolerance are in the good philosophical company of David Hume (1778). Our community may not approve of the practices of some or other religion and, collectively, we may be able to prevent these from taking place. However, if we act to suppress such practices, then we may provoke civil unrest and this may lead to violent confrontation or perhaps even war between rival religious groups. Recognizing this danger, we may decide that it is, all things considered, in our interest to tolerate the religious practices of our rival group, even though we continue to disapprove of these. Many defenders of religious tolerance have found pragmatic justifications to be too weak for their liking because it is contingent on circumstances that can change. If the only basis for tolerating the practices of a religious minority is that we calculate that the costs of suppressing the minority group do not outweigh the benefits, then it seems that we will be warranted in being intolerant towards them when circumstances change and we find that they are more easily suppressed.

Non-pragmatic defences of religious tolerance are associated with the liberal tradition. Liberal toleration is distinctive because it involves a clear separation of the state from religious organisations, one that mirrors the liberal distinction between a public sphere and a private sphere. On classical liberal views, the state has jurisdiction over the public sphere and no entitlement to interfere in the private sphere. Religious practice is generally understood as falling within the private sphere and is thus not subject to state interference (De Roover and Balagangadhara 2008). Not only must the state refrain from interfering in religious practice, on most contemporary interpretations of liberalism the state is understood as having a responsibility to act as a neutral arbiter between competing groups (including religious groups) within society, and to prevent attempts by any of these to interfere with the practices of others (Spector 2008). To this extent, religious tolerance is institutionalised in the modern liberal state.
Attempts to justify the association of the value of religious tolerance with liberalism draw on three main sources: An appeal to the value of autonomy associated with John Stuart Mill (1859), an appeal to epistemic uncertainty in the religious sphere associated with Pierre Bayle (1685), and an appeal to the unfeasibility of religious coercion associated with John Locke (1689). The Millian argument is the most familiar to contemporary liberals and is most closely associated with the widespread view amongst liberals that there is a right to religious freedom. This right is grounded in an appeal to the value of individual autonomy, and on the liberal view religious expression is often regarded as a key area in which individuals can express their individual autonomy.

Bayle’s appeal to epistemic uncertainty is less discussed by modern liberals than Locke and Mill’s respective attempts to justify tolerance, but it continues to be discussed (e.g. Quinn 2001, pp. 65-72; Margalit 1996). According to Bayle (1685) religious believers should allow for the possibility that their own religious beliefs are false and that those of their various rivals are true. Since they ought to be interested in discovering and respecting religious truth, they ought to tolerate other religious beliefs, which may possibly be true.  

Locke (1689) is conventionally interpreted as arguing for religious toleration on the grounds that religious persecution is ineffective and is therefore irrational. In arguing this way, Locke assumes that the main point of religious persecution is to instil particular beliefs in people rather than to change their practices, since the latter can surely can be achieved via persecution. However, his claim that coercion cannot be effective in changing religious beliefs is simply an assertion that is not explicitly based on relevant psychological evidence, and has been strongly challenged by Waldron (1991). But even if Waldron is wrong, and one cannot coerce a devout believer to change her religious beliefs, one can surely use effective coercion to prevent her from proselytizing on behalf of her religion and from effectively transmitting religious practices to future generations; and this may be enough of a victory for the opponent of religious toleration. However, Locke (1689) is sometimes interpreted as making a different point. On Stanton’s (2006) reading of Locke, coercion is ineffective not because it cannot change belief, but because God will not welcome coerced belief. This is of course a theological assumption, and those who do not share it will not be moved by Stanton’s interpretation of Locke. So the price of accepting this, perhaps more plausible reading of Locke, is that Locke’s argument will be able to influence fewer people.

Those who argue for tolerance of particular acts and practices will not usually want to argue for tolerance of all practices in the same domain of activity (Raphael, 1988; Scanlon 2003). For example, those who argue for tolerance of sexual diversity typically do not want to extend tolerance to paedophilia. Likewise, those who argue for the tolerance of other religions often draw the line at ‘sects’ which seek to retain members by utilising ‘brainwashing’ techniques. These individuals are even more unlikely to tolerate religious activities that involve, for example, animal (and perhaps even human) sacrifice. So defenders of particular instances of religious tolerance face a two-fold problem. They need to explain why some religious acts and practices of which they disapprove should be tolerated, while other religious acts and practices, which they also disapprove of, should not be tolerated. Mill
(1859) suggested the ‘harm principle’ as a guide to the appropriate limits of tolerance (Raz 1988). Practices that involve unjustified harm to others should not be tolerated. Of course, exactly what constitutes ‘harm’ and what counts as ‘unjustified’ is a matter of dispute. However the harm principle is a plausible starting point for the delineation of the limits of tolerance for liberals.

The Rise of Tolerance

The rise of religious tolerance in Europe is typically associated with the Enlightenment. Medieval and early modern Europeans were typically not tolerant of deviant religious practices. In fact, Christianity is sometimes seen as the least tolerant of all religions (Zagoria 2003). This tendency towards intolerance may be explained by the salvationist character of much Christian thought, particularly Protestant thought (Mendus 2007, Lecture One). It is hard to justify tolerance of other religions if one sincerely believes that faith in such religions will lead to the denial of salvation and perhaps to eternal damnation. However the connection between salvation-driven arguments for religious intolerance and Protestantism should not be overstated. Mainstream Catholic thought had it that heresy should not be tolerated because of the threat that it poses to salvation. According to Aquinas:

> With regard to heretics … there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. (Summa Theologiae, 2nd part of the 2nd part, question 11, article 3)

Salvationist arguments for religious intolerance were usually only applied to heretical Christians by mainstream Catholic theologians, who tended to tolerate non-Christian religious practices, within limits (Kaplan 2007, pp. 294-330). However a minority of theologians argued for the forcible conversion of non-Christians. Notoriously Duns Scotus argued for the forced conversion of Jews (Turner 2006). His core arguments do not appeal to any particular features of Judaism and so they would seem to apply to all forms of religion other than Christianity (Clarke, forthcoming).

Perhaps a mainstream view in history is that Europe was in the grip of theocratic intolerant oppression until the Age of Enlightenment in the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth century, when church and state were separated and principled arguments for tolerance were developed (e.g. Zagorin 2003, Grayling 2007). The motivations for the shift to a culture of tolerance are, on such views, a combination of the rise of urban commerce and a reaction to the bitter religious wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century in Europe, which manifestly failed to produce a lasting settlement to differences between Catholicism and the
various Protestant religions. It is easy to move from this view to the claim that much of the rest of the world is still in the grip of theocratic intolerance and needs to catch up.

However, some historians, including Kaplan (2007) and Walsham (2006), want to resist the above ‘Whiggish’ view of progress in the Western treatment of religion. They tend to emphasise the various ways in which pragmatically grounded local instantiations of religious tolerance were developed across Europe in advance of the Enlightenment, and the extent to which religious conflicts continued to occur in Europe during the Enlightenment. On this latter view, Western ideas of religious tolerance may not be part of a triumphant movement that is destined to dominate the globe. They might instead be part of a relatively ephemeral intellectual movement that will fail to take root, or persist, without the succour of Western liberal culture. A virtue of this latter view is that its advocates are able to contemplate the possibility of non-Western forms of religious tolerance that are not grounded in the individualist values of the liberal tradition.

One such possible alternative is the ‘millet system’ which flourished in the Ottoman Empire (Kaplan 2007, 240-245). Under this system, Islam was the official religion, although Jewish and Christian religious communities were officially recognised and allowed to organise separately. Kymlicka describes the millet system as a ‘...federation of theocracies’ (1996, p. 82). In a liberal society it is relatively easy for individuals to shift religious allegiances, and it is generally presumed that individuals have a right to do so. Under the millet system, however, it was very hard for individuals to shift religious allegiances, or to have religious allegiances to religious groups that were not recognised by the state. The millet system was designed to uphold established community values and not individual values. Without endorsing the millet system, both Kymlicka (1996) and Kaplan (2007) recognize that it was successful in producing strong, cohesive religious minority communities, and relative harmony between these.

**Early Scientific Work on Religion and Intolerance**

Both the New Atheists and their opponents tend to focus on particular examples of religion causing tolerance or intolerance, rather than engaging in a more systematic analysis of the relevant empirical research. Here we take a close look at the relevant research. Of course, a tendency to produce tolerance or intolerance is not the only aspect of religion that one might focus on. Even if it is shown that religion is a net cause of intolerance, it might be argued that this is outweighed by the potential benefits that religion can generate, with respect mental health, criminal behaviour, altruism, and so forth (for reviews of the numerous papers examining these effects, see Moreira-Almeida, Neto, and Koenig 2006; Koenig, McCullough and Larson 2001; Gartner 1996; Aukst-Margeti and Margeti 2005). Prominent New Atheists, like Richard Dawkins, do not even consider the potential costs associated with the eradication of religious institutions. They simply claim that religion has served as an agent of intolerance.
and an effective ‘weapon’ for provoking intergroup conflict, (e.g. Dawkins 2001), and conclude on that basis that it should be minimized or eliminated.

Our ability to distinguish causes from mere correlations in the social sciences is limited, in part because a detailed mapping of the causal structure of the human social psychological world would require carrying out controlled manipulations of variables that are neither practically feasible nor ethically permissible. As a result, most of the work in the social sciences linking religion in its various manifestations, to intolerance in its equally varied cognitive and behavioural dimensions, is far from definitive. Such work has been geared toward identifying psychometrical constructs that explain and predict substantial elements of observed data. As a result, virtually all research on the link between psycho-religious variables and intolerant attitudes and behaviours has been correlational, and the evidentiary case that has been built around it is circumstantial. Still, work in the psychology and sociology of religion is painting an increasingly detailed picture of the connections between religion and intolerance. New Atheists often portrays themselves as courageously coming to the defence of empiricism, naturalism, and reason in their battle against an intellectually indefensible and morally divisive religious worldview (Dennett 2003); their critics, meanwhile, charge them with ignorance of theological and sociological complexities, as well as a tendency to attribute negative social outcomes to religion when these can more readily be explained by recourse to secular (e.g. political) factors (Cavanaugh 2007). We shall now see how these respective views fare in light of the evidence uncovered.

The scientific study of religion during the early part of the 20th century began to sketch a portrait of religion as a prosocial cultural force. Towering figures in the emerging human sciences saw religion as engendering dispositions and behaviours that benefit communities (James 1902), mitigate aggressive and destructive impulses (Freud 1927), and provide specific reinforcements for adherence to moral norms (Skinner 1969; for a discussion, see Saroglou 2005). By mid-century, however, evidence of the connection between religiosity and intolerance had begun to mount (Allport and Kramer 1946; Rosenblith 1949; Adorno et al. 1950; Stouffer 1955; Rokeach 1960; Fislinger 1976). Religiosity, as measured (for example) by church attendance and frequency of prayer, was consistently shown to covary positively with attitudes, values, dispositions, and behaviours that are conducive to ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance, even controlling for socio-economic factors such as education, age, geographic region, and so on. For example, in a seminal study on the link between religion and intolerance, Stouffer (1955), a prominent sociologist and pioneer of survey research, examined the willingness of Americans to extend civil liberties to communists, socialists, and atheists. Stouffer found a significant inverse correlation between religious commitment (in terms of participation measures) and tolerance (p. 144). In addition, he discovered that different levels of intolerance were associated with different religious denominations in America, including (in descending order of manifest intolerance) Southern Protestants, Catholics, Northern Protestants, and Jews. Work in sociology and political science over the next five decades largely confirmed these findings (see e.g. Reimer and Park 2001; Beatty and Walter 1984; McClosky and Brill 1983; Smidt and Penning 1982; Sullivan et al. 1982; Nunn, Crocket and Williams 1978), including a number of cross-cultural replications (Ponton and Gorsuch 1988; Eisinga, Felling and Peters 1990).
Religiosity is gauged by a variety of measurements, including denominational affiliation, church attendance, and orthodoxy, constituting the so-called ‘three B’s’: belonging, behaviour and belief. The causal relationships between these dimensions of religiosity have been hard to disentangle (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993). Some studies have found that church and synagogue attendance (but not the frequency of personal prayer) are correlated with the support of suicide bombing and combative martyrdom (e.g. Ginges et al. 2007). Others have identified strong connections between denomination and intolerance (Beatty and Walter 1984; Burdette, et al. 2005; Reimer and Park 2001), while still others found belief to be the most important dimension and claim to have shown that a commitment to biblical literalism (Tunitiya 2005), or adherence to doctrinal orthodoxy more broadly (Wilcox and Jelen 1990), best explains observed variations in tolerance (see also Burdette, et al. 2005; but see Eisenstein 2006). Since biblical literalism is a central component of the evangelical tradition (Stackhouse 2000), this latter finding would explain the high positive correlation between evangelicalism and intolerance (Kellstedt, et al. 1996; Layman and Green 1998). Precisely which dimensions of religiosity are the most important determinants of intolerance remains unclear.

The social scientific literature has demonstrated a consistent, substantial and generally negative association between the various components of religiosity and levels of political tolerance. At the same time, an equally sizable and wide-ranging body of evidence began to take shape purporting to link religiosity with prejudice (see Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis 1993 for a review). We will discuss the conceptual and empirical link between prejudice and intolerance in more detail later. For now, it is sufficient to note that there is essentially no evidence that religious people are any less prejudiced than non-religious individuals, and there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that they are generally more prejudiced, depending on the category of prejudice under study (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).

**Extrinsic/Intrinsic Orientations**

Despite the early findings, it seemed to many researchers that religion has two faces when it comes to social behaviour: one that produces a sense of compassion, brotherhood and concern for others, and another darker face that leads to intolerance, bigotry and violence. Perhaps, then, there were competing inclinations associated with different dimensions of religiosity (or ways of being religious) that were not adequately captured by social scientific instruments.

The influential psychologist Gordon Allport described the quintessential paradox of religion when it comes to intolerance. Allport argued that religion is responsible for both making and unmaking prejudice:
While the creeds of the great religions are universalistic, all stressing brotherhood, the practice of these creeds is frequently divisive and brutal. The sublimity of religious ideals is offset by the horrors of persecution in the name of these same ideals (1954, 444).

As Allport suggests, although Christianity is associated with principles of universal love, benevolence and peace, the concrete history of Christianity is punctuated by episodes of unimaginable hatred, intolerance and violence, as noted by Bertrand Russell (1967) in his famous essay rejecting the moral foundations of Christianity. It is this curious and paradoxical character of religion that leads some people (including many of the New Atheists) to claim that the surest cure for prejudice is secularization, while others continue to insist that the best way of fostering compassion, tolerance and peace is to increase religiosity. While it was intuitively clear to Allport and others that religion caused both tolerance and intolerance, these asymmetrical causal relations were not well understood and had yet to be systematically explored. Sharper psychometric instruments were needed to measure the orientations or dimensions of religiosity that were conducive to prosocial and antisocial behaviour, respectively.

To this end, Allport and colleagues (Allport 1966; Allport 1967; Allport and Ross 1967) introduced and operationalized a distinction between two religious ‘orientations’ that were hypothesized to have asymmetrical implications for intolerance, prejudice, and other antisocial attitudes and behaviours. Allport’s religious orientations consisted of functional descriptions of psychological processes, rather than specific religious content. The first, which he called ‘extrinsic religious orientation’ (‘ER’), was conceived as a religiousness that was instrumental in nature, with religion used as a means to obtain an assortment of self-serving ends, such as personal comfort and social rewards of both the terrestrial and heavenly variety (Allport 1966). ER individuals, who were found to comprise a substantial proportion of the religious population, use religion for its intra-psychic benefits, such as increased self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and the reduction in subjective uncertainty (Hogg and Abrams 1993), which flow from the social endorsement of one’s values and social-cultural worldview (Kirkpatrick 1989). These palliative functions are particularly important for high ER individuals, who are characterized by insecure personalities and as responding defensively to worldview threats in ways that can lead to prejudice, intolerance and aggression. According to Allport (1967, 24) ER individuals tend to be prejudiced and intolerant, not because their religion makes them so, but because the same personality traits (such as low self-esteem and insecurity) that motivate them to engage with religion in an instrumental fashion also lead them to derogate and discriminate against values-violating outgroups.

The second orientation, which Allport referred to as the ‘intrinsic religious orientation’ (‘IR’), describes the psychological internalization of the values and norms of one’s religion (Allport and Ross 1967, 441). Allport argued that ER was consistent with prejudice and intolerance, while its intrinsic counterpart all but ruled out these anti-social traits (1967, 29). He even went so far as to advocate public policy that would increase the proportion of intrinsically to extrinsically religious people (ibid, 30).
Allport’s work triggered an avalanche of research in the psychology, sociology, and political science of religion. Most of the initial work confirmed Allport’s early results: namely, that ER is positively associated with anti-social attitudes ($r=.34$), while IR is either uncorrelated or perhaps even negatively correlated with the same ($r=-.05$) (see Donahue 1985 for an extensive meta-analytic review). Although the ER/IR distinction is still in use today, a major conceptual and empirical challenge has been mounting, with a number of prominent researchers advocating the abandonment of Allport’s distinction (see e.g. Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990; Altemeyer 1988). This dissatisfaction stems in part from the fact that the ER/IR scales have failed to covary as negatively and consistently as Allport had predicted, and as such they do not seem to represent opposite ends of a single religious spectrum (Donahue 1985). Nor are ER and IR so unconnected that they resemble orthogonal modes of religiosity. Some authors have even suggested that ER does not measure religiosity at all, but instead captures broader structural features of personality (Wulff 1997).

As it turns out, ER and IR do not produce the asymmetrical pattern of intolerance that Allport had envisioned. While IR has consistently been shown to have little or no correlation with ethnic prejudice, it has been significantly associated with reduced helping behaviour and discrimination against homosexuals, women, communists, and members of other religions (Kirkpatrick 1993; Batson et al. 1999; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999; Hunsberger, Owusu and Duck 1999). Indeed, IR is both negatively and positively correlated with intolerant, discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups, with the valence depending on the kind of prejudice (Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Fisher, Derison and Polley 1994; McFarland 1989) and political issue (Ladyman and Green 1998; McClosky and Brill 1983; Smidt and Penning 1982) being tested for.

Perhaps the strongest reason for abandoning Allport’s distinction is that any correlation between IR and intolerance (and its respective indicators) is significantly diminished once ‘social desirability’ effects are taken into account (Batson, Naifeh and Pate 1978; Pargament et al. 1987). IR is associated with a higher self-report of prosocial behaviour, including tolerance (Batson and Gray 1981), but this asymmetrical self-appraisal does not translate into actual behavioural differences (Batson and Ventis 1982). In other words, although IR people rate themselves as being more prosocial and tolerant than members of out-groups, this difference is not in fact borne out by their behaviour (Hood, Hill and Spilka 2009; Batson et al. 2005). Consistent with these findings, Batson and colleagues (1989) demonstrated in a series of ingenious experiments that IR individuals are not motivated by other-regarding concerns, but rather by egoistic motivations such as intrapersonal and social rewards for being a good person. They found that IR subjects were more likely to come to the aid of a beneficiary, such as a low-income person in need of an expensive medical procedure, when the chances of the subject qualifying to help were low (i.e. when they could look magnanimous without running the risk of having to follow through), or when they were told that most of their peers had agreed to help.

In sum, IR individuals have been shown to be less concerned with the interests of others and more with how they are perceived (Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis 1993). While IR is correlated with increased in-group benevolence, or toward those with whom an individual is in frequent (and potentially cooperative) contact, this effect only applies to relatively low-
cost interactions, does not extend to out-groups or unknowns, and is not associated with a comprehensive sensitivity to the plight of others (Saroglou, Delpierre, and Dernelle 2004). Finally, and again notwithstanding the substantive content of Christian scripture, IR is associated with reduced levels of humility (Rowatt et al. 2002, 232).

Religion as Quest

In light of the conceptual and methodological problems associated with the IR/ER constructs, several psychometric scales were introduced. First, Batson introduced a third orientation that he called ‘religion as quest’ (‘Quest’). Quest was intended to measure the open-minded, compassionate, and highly tolerant orientation that captures the so-called ‘mature’ religion originally proposed by Allport. Quest entails a critical, questioning attitude that construes doubt as positive and truth claims as invariably tentative rather than absolute (Batson and Gray 1981). In addition, and unlike other forms of religiosity, individuals high in Quest are able to face existential questions without reducing their complexity (Batson et al. 1993).

Quest correlates strongly and inversely with prejudice, discrimination and intolerance (Batson et al. 1993; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992), and is associated with reflective moral deliberation (Sapp and Jones 1986), increased helping behaviour (Darley and Batson 1973), cognitive complexity (Batson and Raynor-Price 1983), and humility (Rowatt et al. 2002; Falbo and Shepperd 1986). This makes intuitive sense, since those high in Quest are comfortable in the face of moral and metaphysical uncertainty, which should make them better able to tolerate dissenting views or deviant lifestyles. Although one might suppose that individuals on a quest for spiritual and metaphysical truth would have an inordinate fondness for certainty, those high in Quest seem to value the journey itself, and can endure higher levels of epistemic ambiguity than other religious orientations. Whereas IR is limited to a highly circumscribed form of tolerance (as discussed above), Quest individuals exhibit a much wider sphere of generativity (other-regard), compassion and tolerance than either ER or IR individuals, as indicated by both survey data and behavioural measures (Batson et al. 1986; McFarland 1989; Kirkpatrick 1993). Also in contrast to IR, those high in Quest do appear to be motivated by genuinely altruistic (other-regarding) considerations, and are not prone to giving socially desirable responses that have been shown to skew experimental results (Genia 1996). It should be noted, however, that some authors have suggested that the Quest construct is more of an agnosticism scale than it is a religious one (for a critique of the Quest construct and its psychometric properties, see Altemeyer 1996).

Note, however, that even people scoring high on the Quest scale do not show unlimited tolerance and compassion. They will, for example, tend to decline an opportunity to help an intolerant person where that help would enable that individual to participate in intolerant political activities, like attending an anti-homosexual rally (Batson et al. 2001). In such cases, however, Quest subjects are not demonstrating intolerance to the individual who wants to participate in bigoted activity, but rather toward the intolerant activity itself, which violates their core value of tolerance. Whereas IR individuals are value-violation vigilant and have
been shown to discriminate against intolerant individuals even where those individuals are not participating in value-violating behaviour (such as where an intolerant individual is only seeking to visit a relative), high Quest individuals are likely to help an intolerant person so long as the latter is engaged in relatively innocuous activities (Batson et al. 2001; but see Goldfried and Miner 2002, and the reply by Batson, Denton and Vollmecke 2008). 20

Religious Fundamentalism

Religiosity has been linked to a number of psychometric scales that are associated with “boundary setting” (Kirkpatrick 1999), indicating moral, behavioural, and conceptual rigidity (Wulff 1991, 219-220). These include intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty (Sidanius 1988), conservatism, dogmatism (Altemeyer 1999; Ross, Francis and Craig 2005), ethnocentricism, religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992) and authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996; Duck and Hunsberger 1999). Individuals scoring high on these measures tend to regard deviance from group mores as suspicious, dangerous or evil. They can be found on both the left and right poles of the political spectrum (Mason and Feldman 2007). Two of these theoretical constructs loom large in the literature on religiosity and intolerance: namely, religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism, which are positively correlated with one another and are consistently associated with high levels of intolerance and prejudice toward out-groups (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).

Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) define religious fundamentalism (‘RF’) as:

the belief that there is only one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (1992, 118).

This formulation of fundamentalism was novel, in part because of the theoretical measures that it did not include, such as content-specific orthodoxy, frequency of religious participation, and prejudice, all of which had been incorporated into previous versions of the fundamentalism construct. Note that the strength of religiosity does not imply and should not be equated with RF. Altemeyer and Hunsberger contended that the RF construct did more predictive and explanatory work than the ER/IR distinction championed by Allport. Whereas the relationship between IR and ER is ultimately unclear, RF and Quest scales do appear to sit on opposing ends of the same psychological spectrum (Hunsberger 1995, 118), as RF is strongly and negatively correlated (~.8) with Quest (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Batson and Raynor-Prince 1983). This has led some authors to the conclusion that it is religious fundamentalism, and not religiosity in general or even the ER/IR distinction in
particular, which best explains the observed variation in tolerance. IR is strongly associated with RF, and there is evidence that when we control for RF, the correlation between general religiosity and intolerance/prejudice nearly evaporates (Ellison and Musick 1993; Karpov 2002). If this is correct, then it suggests that church attendance, prayer, and denominational affiliation are not the primary determinants of religion-associated intolerance.

Religious fundamentalism is strongly associated with an unwillingness to extend civil liberties to out-groups (McFarland 1989). The connection between religious fundamentalism and intolerance is likely due to several factors, including a commitment to scriptural literalism and exclusive revealed truth (Wilcox and Jelen 1990), a Manichean perception of the human social world as part of a larger cosmic battle between good and evil (Ellison and Musick 1993), and a general distrust of human nature that leads to a perceived need for authoritarian social institutions (Tamney and Johnson 1997). All of these characteristics are pervasive in religious terrorist rhetoric and justification (Rogers et al. 2007).

Many fundamentalists claim to possess knowledge of the absolute truth concerning matters of morality and perceive dissenting perspectives as threats to eternal salvation, and (in some cases) regard heresy as a punishable offense, much as Aquinas did (see earlier quotation). Fundamentalist churches are more likely to encourage ethnic and religious prejudices from the pulpit (Welch et al. 1993), and they are generally inclined toward political theocracy (Reimer and Park 2001). RF individuals are inclined to support and defer to the divinely sanctioned right to rule of theocratic leaders that impose and enforce legal regimes grounded in exclusive revelatory doctrine (Allport 1967). The cultural isolation and high internal homogeneity of fundamentalist groups can exacerbate pre-existing dispositions toward intolerance. Finally, RF is associated with increased levels of aggression, especially toward values-violators (Altemeyer 1996). Thus, it seems that the prosocial effect of religiosity (see Saroglou et al. 2005; see also Benda and Toombs 2000) disappears when a religious person is a fundamentalist who is confronted with an individual who threatens his or her core values (Batson et al. 1999).

**Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

Hunsberger (1995) sharpened the causal relation between religious variables and intolerance, arguing that it is not RF per se that explains the variation in prejudice and intolerance, but rather the authoritarian components of the RF construct. If we control for authoritarianism, there may be a weak, or even negative, correlation between fundamentalism and intolerance (Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick 2001; Laythe et al. 2002; Hunsberger 1995; Canetti-Nisim 2004). People who score high on the ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ (‘RWA’) scale have been characterized as “equal opportunity bigots,” since experiments suggest that they would effectively deny fundamental political and civil rights to various nationalities, ethnicities, religions, sexual orientations, and political affiliations (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 115). Tellingly, for people high in RWA, belief in God and the ‘correct’ religion is more important than being a good person (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).
Thus, both the RF and RWA studies suggest that it is the way that people are religious, rather than religiosity per se or the content of religious belief, that disposes them toward prejudice and intolerance (Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). Moreover, work with RF and RWA metrics shows that when certain dimensions of religiosity are controlled for, many of religion’s core attributes, such as its moral and spiritual content, are at best orthogonal to and possibly even negatively correlated with many forms of intolerance (Hansen and Norsenzayan 2007). The fact remains, however, that IR is strongly and positively associated with RF (Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989), and RF in turn with RWA (r ≈ 0.7; see Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992). Individuals high in IR but low in RF and RWA are exceedingly rare. Can we say, then, which construct among ER/IR, RF or RWA is the most fundamental predictor of prejudice?

Are religiosity, fundamentalism and prejudice by-products of an authoritarian personality configuration? Might the cognitive and behavioural dispositions have mutually reinforcing effects? The answers to these questions are not known, and constitute important topics for future research.

Orthodoxy

RF and RWA are content neutral constructs that focus on the way beliefs are held, but the success of these constructs does not imply that the religion-intolerance link is entirely unrelated to the content of belief. IR has been shown to correlate with prejudice, both positively and negatively, depending on the specific prescriptions and proscriptions of the relevant religious orthodoxy (Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999). And whereas RF and RWA are highly associated with prejudice and intolerance, Christian Orthodoxy (‘CO’), a distinct content-specific measure (see Kirkpatrick 1993), is negatively correlated with the same (Laythe et al. 2002). As a result, RF and CO can effectively ‘wash one another out’ (Laythe et al. 2002, 630), and since IR is highly associated with both of these constructs, this might explain the general finding that IR is uncorrelated with anti-social attitudes and behaviours.

Most major world religions include norms of tolerance, forgiveness, and equality. That these norms are motivating when internalized is shown by the negative correlation between Christian Orthodoxy and some types of prejudice, discussed above. Yet there are also prescribed prejudices in most major world religions (Coward 1986). For example, there are Biblical passages denigrating homosexuality and condoning the subordination of women. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the religion-intolerance link may hinge on the specific prejudice under investigation. For example, Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick (2001) found that a positive correlation between RF and intolerance to homosexuals remained even after RWA was controlled for (see also Laythe et al. 2002). This may be due in part to the fact that anti-homosexual discrimination is arguably a prescribed (or at least not proscribed) prejudice in many Christian churches. In another study, Bushman et al. (2007) showed how the content of religious belief might influence intolerance and aggression. They presented individuals who believe in God with a vignette, supposedly based on the Bible or ancient
scrolls, in which Yahweh commands that innocent people be murdered along with the perpetrators of a rape. They found that subjects who believed in God, after being exposed to the vignette, were more likely to demonstrate aggression to their laboratory partner than non-believers or believers who had not been presented with the vignette. Since conscious beliefs and attitudes can motivate consistent action (Fazio 1990), it is highly plausible that the content of divine commandments can have behavioural consequences for some religious people. The extent to which religion-associated intolerance can be explained as the correlate of personality traits, or rather as the product of a principled motivation to follow the contentful norms of a religion, remains an open question (Batson et al. 2002). That being said, RWA has been shown to be a stronger predictor of prejudice than the content of community norms (Duck and Hunsberger 1999), and this would seem to explain why the degree of intolerance that RF individuals direct at homosexuals (and others) is often in excess of that prescribed by subjectively authoritative religious doctrine (Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999, 14).

Prejudice versus Intolerance

There is a great deal of research in the psychology of religion examining the link between religion and prejudice. Unfortunately, the terms ‘intolerant’ and ‘prejudiced’ have often been conflated in the literature, with the adjective ‘tolerant’ often used to describe the un-prejudiced (Jackman 1977). Prejudice and tolerance do not, however, sit on opposing ends of a cognitive-behavioural continuum. Tolerance, as that term is generally used, refers to the tendency to ‘put up with’ individuals and groups that abide by a set of values, norms, customs, and political goals that is different from one’s own (e.g. Gibson 2005; Sullivan, et al. 1982, 785; Scanlon 2003, 187). The social scientific definition of tolerance broadly comports with philosophical conceptions (discussed above), although it lacks the important mental state and action-capacity components that are included in Cohen’s (2004) formulation. A commitment to political tolerance typically involves a commitment to democratic procedures, the rule of law, and equal protection under the law.22

Tolerance is a notoriously difficult thing to measure through survey analysis, because in order to measure the extent to which people will countenance dissent or diversity, they need to be asked about their specific attitudes and reactions, and it is always possible that an alternative subject matter would have elicited a different response (Gibson 2005, 317). One way that researchers have attempted to control for these content-specific biases is via the ‘least-liked’ approach (pioneered by Sullivan et al. 1982). Instead of providing subjects with a list of out-groups and then asking a series of tolerance-probing questions about these, the least-liked paradigm allows subjects to pick their most disliked group from a list of groups (and if their least-liked group is not listed, subjects may write it in). Least-liked groups are used since, for tolerance to be possible, it is crucial that the values, norms, and interests of the out-group are not only regarded as different, but actually disliked, or deemed to have a negative moral valence.23
As commonly conceived, ‘prejudice’ is a negative intergroup attitude based on false, simplified, or over-generalized beliefs. Prejudice consists of three components (Hunsberger 1995): a cognitive component involving a set of beliefs or stereotypes about a derogated out-group; an affective component entailing disgust or visceral dislike for the out-group, and a disposition to behave in a socially aversive way toward members of the out-group, both interpersonally and politically in terms of social policies (Harding et al. 1968). One can easily see how pejorative, ‘essentialistic’ stereotypes of out-group members can elicit negative affective responses (e.g. disgust, fear or hatred) toward members of the derogated group, which can then feed back into subjective impressions of the out-group. These three components of prejudice are likely to reinforce one another, given the nature of motivated reasoning and the demonstrated effects of negative affect in general, and disgust reactions in particular, on moral judgment processes (Haidt 2001). It is not difficult to imagine how negative affective responses can mediate anti-social and bigoted behaviour toward members of the out-group, both interpersonally and politically in terms of social policy.

Thus, the pathway from prejudice to intolerance is far from unintelligible. In fact, the third (behavioural) component of prejudice may itself constitute intolerance under many circumstances. Work on attitude-behaviour consistency has found that attitudes and behaviours can be highly aligned when the right sort of moderators are present (see Fazio and Zanna 1981 for a review). It would seem reasonable to surmise, then, that as stereotyping, disgust responses, and prejudicial attitudes increase, the tolerance of values-violating out-group members decreases. Moreover, many of the putatively principled justifications for discrimination, such as the rationale commonly offered for prohibiting Islamic veils in the public sphere in secular European democracies, may turn out to be *ex post facto* rationalizations of pre-existing subjective prejudices. Saroglou et al. (2009) arrived at this conclusion, showing that individuals who strongly support principles of egalitarianism and autonomy tend to be more tolerant toward the veil. A growing body of research continues to demonstrate the powerful effects of ‘hot’ emotion on moral deliberation, with ‘cool’ reason acting after-the-fact to spin complex rational justifications for pre-existing moral intuitions (Haidt 2001).

In theory at least, it is possible that a person be highly prejudiced in terms of the relevant cognitive and affective components, but nonetheless maintain a positive behavioural disposition toward the negatively stereotyped out-group. In practice, however, this combination is probably the exception rather than the rule. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine extreme intergroup atrocities carried out in the absence of significant out-group derogation. Some political scientists have hypothesized that a prejudiced population can be more effectively mobilized by elites toward varying levels of intolerance, ranging from discrimination against immigrants or minorities to segregation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Green and Seher). However, the links between prejudice and political mobilization, and between government-disseminated propaganda and social prejudice, have not been firmly established.

While there is probably a causal trajectory from prejudice to intolerance, classic work in 20th century social psychology, such as the famous Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (1971) studies, show that prejudice is not a necessary condition for intergroup hostility. Perceptions of
authority and hierarchy may be enough to engender counter-attitudinal intergroup behaviours, even in the absence of specific prejudice, xenophobia, or competition for resources.

**In-Group/Out-Group Effects**

Another framework for understanding the link between religion and intolerance is via the well-established in-group/out-group (‘IG/OG’) bias. This is the tendency of individuals to esteem members of the in-group while exhibiting prejudiced attitudes toward members of out-groups, and to discriminate in favour of members of the former and against those of the latter (Brewer 1999; Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002). Much like ethnic and political groupings, religious affiliation can trigger intergroup psychological dynamics that generate stereotypes, negative affects, and anti-social attitudes and behaviours toward out-group members (Jackson and Hunsberger 1999).

Groups in general, and religious groups in particular, provide their members (to varying degrees) with shared norms, values, traditions, and metaphysics, which in turn helps to mobilize, coordinate and justify collective action (see Kruglanski et al. 2006). Religion is an important mode of social identification (Erikson 1982). It provides individuals with a comprehensive social identity, including cosmic and terrestrial worldviews that can anchor the individual in a self-affirming and existential anxiety-reducing social consensus (Hogg, Adelman and Blagg 2009). It is for this reason that epistemic challenges to religious worldviews can generate extreme IG/OG responses, which protect—and in some contexts strengthen—religious identity. When intergroup comparisons are salient, strong positive identification with the in-group is associated with a corresponding degree of out-group derogation (Mummendey, Klink and Brown 2001; Levin and Sidanius 1999). Religion-driven IG/OG dynamics may be especially given to group-centricism, since religious identity often involves clear metaphysical boundaries between the divinely anointed and epistemically privileged community of co-believers on the one hand, and the morally depraved and theologically condemned out-groups on the other.

IG/OG effects may be exacerbated when groups are perceived to be in conflict with one another over scarce resources, political power, or access to the market place of ideas (Sherif 1966; Jackson and Esses 1997). Additionally, individuals with low self-esteem and insecure personalities may be especially vulnerable to IG/OG effects, since acquiring a strong and contrastive social identity is thought to increase self-esteem and provide validation for one’s worldview (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Festinger 1954). Thus, it would seem that individuals who score high on the IR and RF scales would be most susceptible to IG/OG bias, and this does appear to be the case, at least for authoritarians (Greenberg et al. 1992; Duckitt 1989).

The threat to worldview that is posed by the deviant ‘other’ can be mitigated not only by reaffirming the in-group (Jonas and Fischer 2006), but also by derogating, scapegoating, or
acting aggressively toward the out-group. Classic dissonance theory (Festinger 1954) predicts that under certain circumstances, group identification and the intensity of religious beliefs will actually strengthen in the face of a perceived epistemic or existential threat. On this view, worldview challenges, especially those posed by the negatively stereotyped out-group, effectively increase the value of consonant cognitions by triggering belief intensification, or reduce the importance of incoming inconsistent cognitions via out-group derogation or delegitimization. Alternatively, out-group attack in the face of epistemic threat may amount to the misattribution (or projection) of negative arousal (i.e. dissonance) on an external hedonic match (Zanna and Cooper 1974), which may buffer against dissonance-related attitude change. Some scholars, such as Kimball (2002) and Armstrong (2000), interpret the rise of militant Islam and Christian fundamentalism as a reaction to the social and epistemic threat that modernity poses to established religions. This view finds support not only in dissonance theory discussed above, but also in social identity (Altemeyer 2003) and uncertainty-identity (Hogg, Adelman and Blagg 2009) theories.

If religious individuals, especially those high in RF and RWA, are more susceptible to the psychological effects of IG/OG dynamics, mortality salience (Pyszczynski et al. 2003), and threat perception (Wilcox and Jelen 1990), then they may be more subject to manipulation by governments and elites, to whom they are already inclined to defer during intergroup conflict (Atran 2002; Karpov 2002; Kunovich and Hodson 1999). It is certainly possible that non-religious individuals could form comparably ‘entitative’ groups (in terms of their unity, coherence, and functional integration) that trigger similar IG/OG effects (Hogg et al. 2009). But all indicators suggest that prejudice, political intolerance, and out-group derogation are consistently more severe for religious members of religious groups than for non-religious members of non-religious groups, such as atheists. Prejudice and intolerance is directed from religious people to atheists much more so than the other way around (Karpov 2002; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999).

Little is known about the individual psychological mechanisms that motivate extreme intergroup behaviours. These may be grounded in long-standing interethnic hatreds, or constructed from the strategic necessities of local circumstance, or both or neither. One thing that seems fairly certain is that intergroup atrocities are consistently motivated by Manichean, existential fears that the evil ‘other’ threatens to destroy the divinely anointed in-group, and that the best way to stop this is by recourse to extreme violence and other counter-attitudinal behaviours. In this respect, religion-triggered IG/OG dynamics appears to offer a better explanation of mass-scale violence than intrapersonal religious orientation. Evidence for the ‘normality thesis’ (Arendt 1963/1992) concerning the perpetrators of genocide and ethnic cleansing is overwhelming, and it is implausible to think that everyone who participates in such collective brutality happens to share the same religious orientation (see Jackson and Hunsberger 1995).

There are a number of ways that religiosity might play a role in drawing IG/OG boundaries that have important implications for tolerance and prosociality (Hansen and Norenzayan 2006). Gods might ally the in-group closer to the divine and the out-group closer to the animal world, thus dehumanizing or delegitimizing the out-group (Haslam 2006), and thereby paving the way for intolerance, prejudice and aggression (Bar-Tal 1990; Demoulin, Saroglou
and Van Pachterbeke 2008). The desire for purification, often associated with religious ritual and morality (Haidt 2001; Boyer 2001), tends to play an integral role in the motivations and justifications of intergroup violence, and is reflected in the ‘medicalized’ vocabulary typically used to describe these events, such as ‘ethnic cleansing.’

Submission to an authoritarian authority, and the tendency toward stereotyping and out-group derogation, are important steps in the collective move toward intergroup brutality. These features are associated with RWA, which is in turn associated with several manifestations of religious personality. Yet even if it is related to high levels of out-group intolerance, it is possible that religion-mediated IG/OG effects are simultaneously associated with in-group tolerance. Religious in-group identification may not only lead to increased helping behaviour when it concerns fellow group members (Saroglou et al. 2005), but it might also dispose one to give the benefit of the doubt or to ‘let it slide’ when in-group members violate shared norms.

Evolutionary Anthropology

There is an ongoing and vigorous debate concerning the evolutionary origins of religion. Some theorists argue that religion is an adaptation of individuals (Sosis and Alcorta 2003), groups (Wilson 2002), or cultural variants themselves (Dennett 2006), while others contend that it is merely an incidental by-product of other adaptive faculties of mind (Boyer 2001; Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Bloom 2009).

Most adaptive explanations of religion focus on its postulated role in coordinating large, cohesive, and distantly related groups of co-operators, enabling them to solve ecological design problems that no individual group member could solve on her own, and that could not otherwise be solved through more limited coalitions (Sosis and Bressler 2003). By serving as a badge of group membership (Bacharach and Gambetta 2001) and the centerpiece of a moral community (Graham and Haidt 2009; Bering 2006), religion expands the sphere of altruism through a system of fictive kinship grounded in a metaphysical narrative (cf. Kirkpatrick 2005; Wilson 2002; Dunbar 2008). In this way, religion may have served as the epistemic and behavioural glue for larger, more cohesive human groups, both prior to and after the emergence of agriculture and the rise of chiefdoms with specialized divisions of labour (Diamond 1997). Religious tolerance may have played a similar role in the subsequent expansion of cooperating communities that took place over the last few centuries in Europe (see discussion above; Wilson 2002).

Achieving the optimal level of intra-group altruism is in essence a ‘goldilocks’ problem: on the one hand, if individuals exhibit too little altruism (i.e. their cooperating circle is under-inclusive), then collective action will be undermined by individual selfish behaviour; on the other hand, if individuals’ prosocial attitudes and behaviours are over-inclusive (e.g. they
include malfeasors, strangers, or known non-reciprocators, or they make one reluctant to
punish in-group free-riders), then the benefits of their prosocial behaviour will accrue neither
to the group nor to the individual’s lineage. Although the idea is speculative, religion-
associated IG/OG dynamics could serve as a proximate mechanism for generating both intra-
group partiality and intergroup aggression (as well as other forms of negative out-group
contact), both of which may be extremely costly for individuals but highly beneficial to
groups. In this way, markers of group identity, including and especially religious identity,
may have provided an evolutionary solution to the goldilocks problem of group altruism.

Religion may have a unique role to play in this respect, since many of its core elements, such
as prayer and ritual, have been shown to generate neuropsychological states that attenuate the
boundary between self and group, increase the sense of interconnectedness and belonging,
and reduce the sense of personal identity, so as to enable individuals to identify more strongly
with the collective entity (Whitehouse 2000). The effects of communal ritual are
psychologically powerful, inducing a degree of de-individuation that leads to a convergence
in mood, mutual affection, and a sense of belonging in convening co-believers (Marshall
2002). Theoretically this feeling of interconnectedness is limitless, but in practice it is
reliably reined in by ‘coalitional’ forms of religiosity (Hansen and Norenzayan 2006), which
together with prayer and ritual can maintain an ‘optimal’ evolutionary balance of prosocial
and antisocial behaviour.

Being a member of a group entails having a “patterned expectation of forms of interaction
which are morally binding on [oneself] and on other members” (Merton 1975, 285-286;
Hogg, Adelman and Blagg 2009). It would not be surprising if the outer limits of individual
tolerance coincided with the perceived boundaries of the cooperating community. Indeed, we
have seen that with the exception
of Quest orientation, all modes of religiosity seem to
underwrite limited coalitions of cooperators, creating a moral community of unrelated
individuals that rate fellow members more highly on virtually every relevant social scale than
individuals belonging to out-groups. These findings are consistent with theories that religious
behaviour functions to provide reliable signals of cooperative intent (Henrich 2007; Bulbulia
2004). Moreover, there is a general intergroup perception that religious individuals are more
likely to cooperate than non-religious ones. In studies on patterns of cooperation in prisoner’s
dilemma games, subjects were more likely to cooperate, and to judge their counterpart as
more likely to cooperate, with a person who majored in religi
ous studies rather than business
(de Dreu, Yzerbyt and Leyens 1995). That a witness’ testimony could historically be
impeached in court on the sole basis that he or she was an atheist (Kaufman 2003) likewise
speaks to the general association between perceived religiosity and perceived trustworthiness.

For robust cultural animals like humans, group living is not only about the benefits of
collective action. From a psycho-developmental perspective, humans rely heavily on their kin
and peers for developing a coherent, action-guiding narrative regarding the events and objects
in their environment. Kruglanski and colleagues (2006, 85) have argued that a shared social
reality is a necessary precondition for effective group action. It is therefore conceivable that
groups anchored in a religious belief system will benefit from this cohesion-performance
function, and hence will be accompanied by mechanisms for increasing intra-group epistemic
and behavioural homogeneity, and for suppressing dissent and deviance (see Bar-Tal 1990).
A group’s cohesion depends in part on its ability to instil conformity of belief and behaviour, and to shun dissent and division, in order to prevent internal fractures from arising and undermining its collective action-orientation. Relative group unanimity with respect to goals, values, norms, and ideologies may be facilitated by an autocratic, top-down political structure that enhances epistemic homogeneity while suppressing dissent, thereby allowing for efficient decision-making at the level of the group (Kurglanski et al. 2006). It follows that under some ecological circumstances, intolerance may be conducive to the viability and success of collective action, as may be the case when a group is compelled to make decisions quickly or under high stress, or when an out-group is perceived to present a threat to in-group identity.

Although intolerance in its various manifestations, from subtle discrimination to outright aggression, may sometimes be adaptive in the intergroup competition for resources (Duntley and Buss 2004), this in no way implies that intolerance is ethically acceptable or even pragmatically desirable. Understanding the dimensions of religiosity that give rise to social and political intolerance will give us more effective tools for fostering intergroup cooperation and reducing the incidence and severity of large-scale conflict.

References


Cambridge University Press.


Notes

1 For more on this dichotomy see Mendus (2007, Lecture Three)

2 Similar sentiments are expressed by Stern (2003, p. 283)
Not surprisingly new atheists polemics have been met by theistic polemics. See for example, D’Souza (2007), Garrison (2007, and Haught (2008).

Stenger also accuses religion of having supported “… slavery, the oppression of women, ethnic cleansing, serfdom, the divine right of kings, and the extraction of testimony by torture”. He adds that it has opposed “… anesthetics, lightning rods, sanitation, vaccination, eating meat on Friday and birth control” (2009, p. 69).

These will be used interchangeably.

Famously, according to Goethe, ‘To tolerate is to insult’ (Forst 2007).

Other accounts of toleration are due to Nicholson (1985), Mendus (1989) and Fotion and Elfstrom (1992).

Similarly Jordan informs us that if “S morally tolerates P’s doing S” is true, then S must “…believe that she is doing a good [or right] thing by doing nothing” (1997, p. 213).

Churchill argues similarly (1997, p. 191). We are unconvinced that this clause should form part of the definition. It seems to us that someone in a situation entirely lacking in diversity might disapprove of another’s actions or practices and decide to tolerate these nevertheless. I might live in a community where everybody smokes, including myself. However, I might disapprove of smoking (even though I smoke) and decide that it ought to be tolerated.

This point is also made by Heyd (1996, p. 14)

Sabl (2009) interprets Hume (1778) as disputing that a pragmatic justification for toleration need be conditional on circumstance. On this ‘indirect consequentialist’ view there are pragmatic grounds for the state to impose and enforce a universal policy of upholding the value of religious toleration.

In addition to preventing the interference of some groups in the activities of others, the state may sometimes need to actively promote the value of tolerance, especially when intolerant attitudes become prevalent within a particular society.

Mill (1859, Chapter Two) argues somewhat similarly.

Marshall (1994) and Ashcraft (1996) both argue for the importance of theological presuppositions for a proper understanding of Locke’s political philosophy.

Kymlica describes the millet system as ‘hypercommunitarian’ (1996, p. 96)

See also Halbertal (1996).

Dawkins (2001) likens religion to a weapon, stating that “to fill a world with religion, or religions of the Abrahamic kind, is like littering the streets with loaded guns.”

Note, however, that although evangelicals lag behind other groups in relative tolerance, they are still generally tolerant in terms of the absolute proportion of tolerant to intolerant evangelicals (Smith 2000).

While there have been some reports that the relationship between religiosity and prejudice is curvilinear rather than linear (Spilka, Hood and Gorsuch 1985)—that is to say, people who attend
church either at very high or very low frequencies are the least likely to be highly prejudiced—these results are controversial (see e.g. Hunsberger 1995).

20 Comparable results have been obtained in the context of ‘Spirituality’, a construct that is distinguished from all of the above religious orientations including Quest. Spiritual individuals exhibit a “personal pursuit of existential understanding and an approach to the divine and sacred that typically revolves around self-transcendence” (Hogg, Adelman and Blagg 2009). Like Quest, high levels of Spirituality are associated with a more inclusive prosocial behavior that is not significantly modulated by in-group out-group dynamics (Saroglou 2003; Saroglou et al. 2005; Saroglou et al. 2009).

21 Note that religion-related variables are probably not the most important predictors of social and political intolerance. Threat perception (Jackson and Esses 1997), personal insecurity (Eigenberger 1998; Shaffer and Hastings 2007), and lack of commitment to norms of democracy appear to be stronger indicators of prejudice and intolerance (Marcus, et al. 1995; Sullivan, et al. 1982).

22 Note that when political tolerance is measured in the abstract, that is, in terms of support for democratic institutions per se, such as equal protection under the law, majority rule, minority rights, freedom of speech, etc., there is little response variability among religious and non-religious individuals (see Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan et al. 1978; McClosky and Brill 1983). When group content is added, however, the responses change considerably, as the foregoing discussion suggests.

23 Note that although tolerance conceptually requires a negative or disapproving attitude toward an out-group, it need not and indeed usually will not involve extreme stereotyping or disgust directed at out-group members. Conversely, an out-group need not be disliked to be the subject of intolerance, since the latter can be motivated by desires for conformity or some other end, rather than negative affect.